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To evaluate risk factors for infection with highly patho-
genic avian inﬂ  uenza A virus (H5N1) in backyard chickens in 
Bangladesh, we conducted a matched case–control study. 
We enrolled 25 case farms (cases March–November 2007) 
and 75 control farms (June–November 2007). We used a 
questionnaire to collect farm data, which were analyzed by 
matched-pair analysis and multivariate conditional logistic 
regression. Factors independently associated were offer-
ing slaughter remnants of purchased chickens to backyard 
chickens (odds ratio [OR] 13.29, 95% conﬁ  dence interval 
[CI] 1.34–131.98, p = 0.027), having a nearby water body 
(OR 5.27, 95% CI 1.24–22.34, p = 0.024), and having con-
tact with pigeons (OR 4.47, 95% CI 1.14–17.50, p = 0.032). 
Separating chickens and ducks at night was protective (OR 
0.06, 95% CI 0.01–0.45, p = 0.006). Reducing these risks 
and taking protective measures might reduce the risk for 
inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) infection in backyard chickens.
H
ighly pathogenic avian inﬂ   uenza (HPAI) A virus 
(H5N1) is a deadly zoonotic pathogen; from 1997 
through 2008, a total of 413 human cases were reported in 
15 countries, and 256 persons died (1). By March 2008, the 
virus had been identiﬁ  ed in birds in 61 countries (2). The 
persistence of the virus in poultry over a wide geographic 
area strengthens the hypothesis that a mutant virus might 
evolve and initiate a human pandemic. To reduce this 
threat, every country should have a surveillance system for 
detecting the virus in poultry, including backyard ﬂ  ocks.
Worldwide, poultry production has recently undergone 
rapid change, including the introduction of intensive pro-
duction, new breeds, improved biosecurity, and preventive 
health measures. In developing countries, however, adop-
tion of this type of production has been limited because 
of the costs of infrastructures to maintain biosecurity for 
birds, quality hybrid chicks, balanced feed, biologics, and 
quality veterinary care (3). Up to 80% of the poultry in Af-
rica and Asia are kept in backyard-type systems (3,4), and 
these birds represent a substantial economic resource for 
impoverished rural populations.
In Bangladesh, ≈89% of rural households have back-
yard poultry (5), and many households keep chickens and 
ducks on the same property (6). In the absence of fences 
or other barriers, backyard chickens roam freely from one 
property to another. Because backyard chickens are reared 
in such free-range systems, they are more vulnerable to the 
HPAI (H5N1) virus infection; and, if they become infect-
ed, they can transmit the virus to domestic ducks, in which 
the virus can perpetuate (7–9) and infect more backyard 
chickens. This cycle of virus transmission between back-
yard chickens and ducks would continue until intercepted. 
HPAI (H5N1) virus in backyard chickens also poses a seri-
ous threat to public health because of the frequent and close 
contacts between poultry and humans. Little has been pub-
lished about the risk factors associated with HPAI (H5N1) 
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virus infection in backyard chickens in any parts of the 
world, and to our knowledge, nothing has been published 
about the risk factors in Bangladesh. Because understand-
ing the risk factors for the virus in backyard chickens and 
preventive measures might slow or prevent the spread of 
the virus, we conducted a case-control study to determine 
the risk factors for HPAI (H5N1) virus infection in back-
yard chickens in Bangladesh.
Materials and Methods
Study Population and Case Deﬁ  nition
Bangladesh is composed of 4,500 unions (local gov-
ernment units that comprise several villages) and 90,500 
villages (10). Of the total poultry population in the country 
(≈222 million birds), 50% are backyard poultry, predomi-
nantly indigenous (nondescriptive) chickens and mostly 
reared in free-range systems on the homesteads in these 
villages (10). In Bangladesh, villagers sometime rear Fay-
oumi and Sonali (a cross-bred F1 generation of Fayoumi 
[female] and Rhode Island Red [male]) chickens in a semi-
scavenging system (11–13) and occasionally in intensive 
systems. All 25 HPAI outbreaks recorded in indigenous (n 
= 20 farms), Fayoumi (n = 2), and Sonali (n = 5) chick-
ens in village areas in Bangladesh by November 17, 2007, 
were considered outbreaks in backyard chickens, and the 
farms were enrolled in our study as case backyard farms. 
By date of onset of clinical signs, the ﬁ  rst outbreak of HPAI 
in backyard chickens was recorded on March 22, 2007, the 
date on which Bangladesh was ofﬁ  cially declared HPAI 
(H5N1) virus infected. In 2007, the numbers of backyard 
farms infected were 1 farm in March, 3 in April, 7 in May, 
7 in June, 2 in July, 1 in September, 3 in October, and 1 in 
November.
A case backyard farm was deﬁ  ned as one that had 
a high chicken mortality rate and on which inﬂ  uenza vi-
rus A subtype H5 was detected from tracheal samples 
of 2 chickens by reverse transcription–PCR (RT-PCR) 
using a primer set hemagglutinin (HA) oligo 5′ (5′-
ACACATGCYCARGACATACT-3′) and HA oligo 3′ 
(5′-CTYTGRTTYAGTGTTGATGT-3′), as described by 
Lee et al. (14). Testing was done at the National Refer-
ence Laboratory for Avian Inﬂ  uenza in Bangladesh. Case 
reporting of HPAI (H5N1) in chickens in Bangladesh and 
detailed laboratory diagnosis, including diagnostic recon-
ﬁ  rmation from the Veterinary Laboratory Agency in the 
United Kingdom, has been described (15).
For each case farm, we selected and enrolled 3 control 
backyard farms, each of which was within 1–10 km of a 
case farm. Each unaffected village in this zone of selec-
tion was assigned a unique number, and 2 were randomly 
selected by lottery. One villager from each selected village 
was asked to give 10 names of the backyard farm own-
ers in the village who had reared village chickens for >1 
year. These 10 names with distinct numbers were used as 
the sample frame for the village. From the sample frame 
of the ﬁ  rst selected village, we randomly chose 2 backyard 
farm owners who had adult chickens (>6 months of age) 
and chicks (<1 month of age) and whose chickens had not 
died during the clinical phase of HPAI on the case farm. 
Likewise, 1 backyard farm owner was selected from the 
sample of the second village. To ﬁ  nd control farms with 
Sonali or Fayoumi chickens, the same (1–10 km) zone of 
selection was used, but the names of the farm owners were 
drawn from the local upazila (a lower administrative unit in 
Bangladesh) veterinary ofﬁ  ce and used as the sample from 
which to randomly select 3 farms. Because biologics were 
scarce, serologic testing to conﬁ  rm the noninfected status 
of the control farms was not attempted.
Global positioning system coordinates from the case 
and control farms were collected during farm visits and en-
tered into a digitized map of Bangladesh. A geographic in-
formation system program (Arc View 9.1; Environmental 
System Research Institute, Redlands, CA, USA) was used 
(Figure).
Data Collection and Survey Method
A questionnaire designed for this study was pretested 
at 5 case farms. The questionnaire was then modiﬁ  ed ac-
cording to new variables encountered during pretesting. In 
the ﬁ  nal questionnaire, 59 variables were surveyed (spread-
sheet available from P.K.B.). The questionnaire was then 
administered on the case and control farms by 2 veterinar-
ians trained to administer questionnaires; they interviewed 
farm owners or, if owners were absent, any adult family 
members. Variables collected addressed geographic loca-
tion, stock information, ﬂ  ock health history, and overall 
farm management. All interviews were conducted in Ben-
gali, the only spoken language in the study area, during 
June–November 2007.
Statistical Analysis
The collected data were entered into a spread sheet 
program (Excel; Microsoft, Redmond, WA, USA) and 
transferred into Epi Info 2000 (Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA) for analysis. To 
estimate the strength and statistical signiﬁ  cance of associa-
tions between risk factors and HPAI (H5N1) virus infec-
tion, we used the Mantel-Haenszel matched-pair analysis 
(McNemar) test. An association was considered signiﬁ  cant 
if 2-sided tests of signiﬁ  cance had a p value <0.05. To ex-
amine independence of effects, we conducted multivariate 
conditional logistic regression using the conditional logis-
tic regression (CLogit) function in Stata 9.0 for Windows 
(Stata Corp., College Station, TX, USA). Any variables 
with p<0.2 after matched-pair analysis were included in 
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the initial model. A backward stepwise variable–selection 
strategy was used to construct a ﬁ  nal model with a signiﬁ  -
cance level of p<0.05.
Results
Population Statistics
Indigenous, Fayoumi, and Sonali chickens were raised 
on 20, 2, and 3 backyard farms, respectively. Median num-
ber (and range) of indigenous chickens was 24 (3–88) on 
case farms and 14 (5–50) on control farms and of Fayoumi/
Sonali chickens was 950 (125–1,970) on case farms and 
2,200 (1,500–3,500) on control farms. Chickens of various 
ages (mean 35.7 weeks [range 3.5–130]) were raised on 10 
of the case farms, but precise ages of chickens on 15 case 
farms were not provided by the owners; 6 said they had 
only adult chickens, and 9 said they had adult chickens and 
young chicks. Adult and young indigenous chickens were 
raised on the 60 control farms.
Matched-Pair Analysis
The results of matched-pair analysis (Table 1) showed 
that offering slaughter remnants of purchased chickens to 
backyard chickens (within 21 days of the onset clinical 
signs in case farms) had the strongest point estimate of ef-
fect (matched odds ratio [OR] 22.1) and high statistical sig-
niﬁ  cance (p<0.001) despite wide 95% conﬁ  dence intervals 
(CIs) of 2.7–177.7. Other factors positively associated with 
case farms were migratory birds around a farm (OR 7.5, 
95% CI 1.5–38.7, p = 0.010), rodents on the farm (OR 5.8, 
95% CI 2.0–16.8, p = 0.001), contact with pigeons (OR 5.5, 
95% CI 1.9–16.0, p = 0.001), and a nearby body of water 
(OR 3.7, 95% CI 1.5–9.5, p = 0.004). Protective factors 
(OR <1) for case backyard farms were placing chickens 
and ducks in different shelters at night (OR 0.1, 95% CI 
0.1–0.5, p = 0.001) and having a commercial farm within 
0.5 km (OR 0.3, 95% CI 0.1–0.9, p = 0.028).
Multivariate Analysis
Eight variables with p<0.2 were considered for inclu-
sion in the conditional logistic regression model to estimate 
independence of effects (Table 2). The ﬁ  nal conditional lo-
gistic regression model identiﬁ  ed 3 variables as indepen-
dent risk factors for HPAI (H5N1) infection of backyard 
chickens in Bangladesh (Table 3). They were 1) offering 
slaughter remnants of purchased chickens to backyard 
chickens (within 21 days of the clinical onset of the dis-
ease) (OR 13.29, 95% CI 1.34–131.98), 2) having nearby 
body of water (OR 5.27, 95% CI 1.24–22.34), and 3) hav-
ing contact with pigeons (OR 4.47, 95% CI 1.14–17.50). 
The ﬁ  nal model also identiﬁ  ed a protective factor: placing 
chickens and ducks in different shelters at night (OR 0.06 
95% CI 0.01–0.45).
Discussion
We used analytic epidemiologic techniques to un-
veil the possible risk factors associated with inﬂ  uenza 
(H5N1) infection for backyard chickens in Bangladesh so 
that effective risk management can be advocated. A few 
published reports quantify the risk factors for inﬂ  uenza 
(H5N1) infections in commercial chickens (16,17), but to 
our knowledge, analytic epidemiologic reports quantifying 
risk factors for backyard chickens are few, if any. The re-
sults of this study should contribute to the understanding of 
risk factors associated with inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) infections in 
backyard chickens in other developing countries, particu-
larly in southern Asia.
Although only 1 case of inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) in a human 
has been reported in Bangladesh, the country’s poultry sec-
tor has been severely affected; by July 2009, a total of 325 
outbreaks had been reported in chickens, 51 of which were 
in backyard chickens (www.moﬂ  .gov.bd/daily_birdﬂ  u_re-
port.pdf). Because of limited manpower, the country re-
lies predominantly on passive surveillance to detect HPAI 
outbreaks in chickens. Thus, the possibility of unreported 
cases occurring in backyard chickens in some parts of the 
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Figure. Locations of 25 backyard farms where outbreaks of highly 
pathogenic avian inﬂ  uenza A virus (H5N1) infection occurred during 
March–November 2007 (red stars) and 75 control backyard farms 
(yellow circles), Bangladesh.RESEARCH
country cannot be ruled out. These hidden and unreported 
infections in backyard chickens can help perpetuate the 
virus, posing a serious challenge to eradication efforts. 
Strengthening active instead of passive surveillance and 
generating awareness at the rural level of risk factors for 
the HPAI (H5N1) virus infection in backyard chickens, 
and their management, might help reduce the virus load in 
poultry in the country.
Stalls with live poultry can be found at virtually every 
kitchen or village market in Bangladesh. At the local mar-
kets, villagers can sell their poultry to local persons or to 
poultry vendors, who buy poultry in bulk to sell at larger 
city markets. When villagers fear a disease outbreak, they 
start selling apparently healthy and even clinically diseased 
chickens. Diseased chickens are cheaper, encouraging other 
villagers to buy them for meat. They purchase live chickens 
and slaughter them at home. They then offer the slaugh-
ter remnants, inedible for humans, to their own backyard 
chickens, which scavenge and forage around the slaughter 
places. Such practice occurred at 8 (32%) case farms <21 
days of the onset of the clinical signs (Table 1); this prac-
tice appears to be strongest risk factor for HPAI (H5N1) 
infection in backyard chickens in Bangladesh.
Another risk factor was domestic ducks, which are 
considered a “Trojan horse” for the HPAI (H5N1) virus 
(7–9). Their main feed sources are vegetation, small ﬁ  sh, 
amphibians, snails, oysters, and other crustaceans, found in 
and around water. The water bodies and their banks might 
become contaminated with the HPAI (H5N1) virus by vi-
rus-shedding ducks that congregate at these places. Back-
yard chickens might be exposed to the virus while sharing 
the same banks near the body of water, which could explain 
why a nearby body water appeared to be an independent 
risk factor.
The inﬂ  uence of 2 kinds of bodies of water on the 
HPAI outbreaks in backyard chickens was assessed by in-
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(n = 25), no. (%) 
Control farms 
(n = 75), no. (%) 
Matched OR
(95% CI)*  p value 
Farm <5 km from nearest veterinary hospital  15 (60.0)  41 (54.7)  1.3 (0.5–3.2)  0.636
Nearby (<0.1 km) body of water   16 (64.0)  23 (30.7)  3.7 (1.5– 9.5)  0.004
Farm <0.5 km from larger body of water   15 (60.0)  50 (66.7)  0.7 (0.3–1.9)  0.543
Commercial farm within 0.5 km  9 (36.0)  44 (58.7)  0.3 (0.1–0.9)  0.028
Migratory birds seen around farm  6 (24.0)  5 (6.7)  7.5 (1.5–38.7)  0.010
Local live bird market within <5-km radius 24 (96.0)  73 (97.3)  0.7 (0.1–7.4)  0.747
Farm <1 km from live bird market  17 (68.0)  50 (66.7)  1.1 (0.4–3.0)  0.895
Contact with ducks  22 (88.0)  55 (73.3)  4.0 (0.8–20.1)  0.062
Contact with pigeons  16 (64.0)  21 (28.0)  5.5 (1.9–16.0)  0.001
Presence of rodents  12 (48.0)  9 (12.0)  5.8 (2.0–16.8)  0.001
Chickens and ducks on the same farm  11 (44.0)  40 (53.3)  0.7 (0.3–1.7)  0.415
Chickens and ducks in different night shelters 2 (8.0)  31 (41.3)  0.1 (0.1–0.5)  0.001
Frequent (|1×/wk) cleaning of shelter  18 (72.0)  44 (58.7)  1.8 (0.7–4.9)  0.221
No disinfection in shelter  4 (16.0)  10 (13.3)  3.0 (0.2–48.0)  0.448
Disposal of bird in open space  19 (76.0)  58 (77.3)  0.9 (0 .3– 3.2)  0.869
Recently purchased chickens brought in†  5 (20.0)  10 (13.3)  1.7 (0.5–5.7)  0.421
Offering slaughter remnants of purchased chickens† 8 (32.0)  2 (2.7)  22.1 (2.7–177.7)  0.000
Death of neighbor’s chickens  7 (28.0)  20 (26.7)  1.1 (0.4–2.8)  0.900
Source of chicks = own hatched   5 (20.0)  20 (26.7)  0.4 (0.1–2.0)  0.226
*Matched-pair analysis using McNemar (Mantel-Haenszel) test statistics. OR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval. 
†Within 21 days of the onset clinical signs on case backyard farms. 
Table 2. Initial results from multivariate analysis of potential risk factors for highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (H5N1) in backyard 
chickens, Bangladesh, 2007* 
Risk factor  Odds ratio  95% Confidence interval  p value 
Nearby (<0.1 km) body of water   3.64  0.82–16.18  0.089 
Commercial farm within 0.5 km  3.57  0.34– 37.82  0.291 
Migratory bird seen around farm  3.37  0.05–234.59  0.575 
Contact with ducks  1.47  0.15–14.29  0.740 
Contact with pigeons  7.64  1.00–58.48  0.050 
Presence of rodents  7.94  0.89–72.61  0.067 
Chickens and ducks in different night shelters  0.08  0.01–0.71  0.023 
Offering slaughter remnants of purchased chickens†  9.02  0.77–105.79  0.080 
*Conditional logistic regression; initial set with 8 variables entered; Ȥ
2 for likelihood ratio test = 43.85; p>0.001; no. observations = 100. 
†Within 21 days of the onset clinical signs in case backyard farms. HPAI in Backyard Chickens, Bangladesh
corporating 2 variables: 1) presence of a nearby (<0.1 km) 
body of water and 2) distance <0.5 km from a larger body 
of water. The latter variable was meant for any larger wa-
ter-logged paddy or open ﬁ  eld, lagoon, marsh, river, lake, 
or canal where water and migratory birds live or take ref-
uge. These bodies of water are sometimes shared by do-
mestic ducks; but generally, ducks on backyard farms feed 
on nearby bodies of water, predominantly ponds made by 
the birds’ owners for household purposes or aquaculture. 
Secondarily, ducks roam in these ponds to collect feed. 
Presence of a larger body of water within 0.5 km of a back-
yard farm seems to have no causal association with the oc-
currence of HPAI in backyard chickens in Bangladesh, but 
the presence of a nearby pond might.
In 1997, domestic pigeons (Columbia spp.) were 
largely resistant to infection with an HPAI (H5N1) virus 
isolated from Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 
People’s Republic of China (18); other studies showed that 
they appeared to be more resistant to infection than many 
other avian species (19,20). In Bangladesh, many backyard 
farmers rear chickens, ducks, pigeons, and sometimes other 
poultry in groups of mixed ages. Domestic pigeons are a 
major source of meat in Bangladesh, and not 1 pigeon in 
the country has been reported dead of inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) 
infection. The risk factor of contact with pigeons included 
2 categories: the owners’ own domestic pigeons and neigh-
bors’ visiting pigeons. In a complex of backyard farms in 
Bangladesh, pigeons are allowed to feed with other farm 
poultry; in addition, pigeons of 1 backyard farm frequently 
visit others for additional feed. Oronasal secretions and fe-
ces from sick, or dead, backyard chickens with HPAI, have 
a high virus titer, thereby polluting the farm. Pigeons’ feed-
ing and behavior probably allows them to come in close 
contact with the secretions of the infected or dead chick-
ens or with fomites, enabling them to transmit the virus 
mechanically. Nettles et al. (21) reported that pigeons and 
some wild birds—crows, mourning doves, vultures, and 
others—are not responsible for dissemination of inﬂ  uenza 
virus (H5N2) among poultry farms. However, in contrast 
to the ﬁ  ndings of Nettles et al. (21), dead crows in different 
areas of Bangladesh were found to be positive for inﬂ  uenza 
virus (H5) (neuraminidase was not determined) (22). Be-
cause of the lack of evidence of mechanical transmission of 
inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1) through pigeons in backyard chick-
ens, the hypothesis that they are mechanical transmitters 
of inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1) under the prevailing conditions 
of backyard chicken farms in Bangladesh cannot be con-
ﬁ  rmed without a thorough virologic study.
Some owners also offer supplementary feeds, predom-
inantly cereals or their byproducts, to their chickens and 
ducks, usually in the evening when they are placed in the 
night shelters to protect them from predators. No domestic 
duck in Bangladesh has been reported dead of inﬂ  uenza vi-
rus (H5N1) infection. Placing chickens and ducks in sepa-
rate night shelters appeared to be a protective factor. On the 
contrary, an association with inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) was found 
with rearing them on the same farm.
In developing countries, including Bangladesh, bios-
ecurity enhancement, according to the Food and Agricul-
ture Organization of the United Nations, poultry produc-
tion system 4 is impossible to adopt. However, practical 
ways to minimize the risk factors identiﬁ  ed in this study 
are possible in these countries, as follows. Chickens must 
not be fed remnants of slaughtered chickens that have been 
purchased from markets or mobile poultry vendors, and 
inedible portions thus produced must be disposed of hy-
gienically. Villagers should not buy any obviously or ap-
parently sick chickens, although they are cheaper, because 
these birds pose a serious threat to the villagers’ health and 
to the health of their backyard chickens. Enactment of laws 
with punitive measures for selling clinically sick chick-
ens anywhere in the country and strict implementation of 
these laws are vital for limiting the spread of the virus from 
live bird markets to backyard chickens and vice versa. In-
dividual backyard farm owners should be encouraged to 
rear only chickens or ducks; but if that is impractical, the 
owners should be advised to construct separate night shel-
ters for ducks and chickens. Chickens should be limited or 
prevented from scavenging along the banks of bodies of 
water. During feeding, a family member can prevent pi-
geons from joining the ﬂ  ock; any remaining feed must be 
removed carefully.
Because backyard chickens are a vital economic re-
source in Bangladesh, backyard farmers cannot be pre-
vented from rearing them. Therefore, avoidance of the risk 
factors identiﬁ  ed in this study, and implementation of pro-
tective factors, might reduce the risk for inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) 
infection in backyard chickens in the country.
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Table 3. Results of final model with potential risk factors for highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (H5N1) in backyard chickens, 
Bangladesh, 2007* 
Risk factor  Odds ratio  95% Confidence interval  p value 
Nearby (<0.1 km) body of water   5.27   (1.24–22.34)  0.024 
Contact with pigeons  4.47   (1.14–17.50)  0.032 
Chickens and ducks in different night shelters  0.06   (0.01–0.45)  0.006 
Offering slaughter remnants of purchased chickens†  13.29   (1.34–131.99)  0.027 
*Conditional logistic regression; final model with 4 variables entered; Ȥ
2 for likelihood ratio test = 38.82; p>0.001; no. observations = 100. 
†Within 21 days of the onset clinical signs in case backyard farms. RESEARCH
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